

POST INCIDENT ANALYSIS

936 VEIRS MILL ROAD

JUNE 6, 2012

BC DOUG HANSON BC 703



This is a post incident analysis for a house fire at 936 Veirs Mill Road on June 6, 2012, at 1705. Fire rescue units found a single story house well involved on arrival. The lone occupant of the house had escaped with burns to the hands and face. The PIA will cover the actions of all units and will note improvements that need to be corrected.

Dispatch: At 1705, Engine Co. 3, 21, 25, 33, 26 Trucks 703, AT 723, RS 703 and A 723. Note: Truck 3 failed to respond.

RID was dispatched which included, T 725, RS 742 and M723. T 703 failed to respond and AT 723 was bumped up to first due and T 725 second due. T 740 replaced T 725 on the RID.

Two additional ambulances were dispatched for injured firefighters, A 703 and Ambulance 703 B. Air Unit 733 and canteen 733 also responded.

The DOC, C 703 F and C 702 B and Safety 700 also responded. Several utilities from Co. 3 also responded.

The Building: The house is described as a single story single family occupancy of wood frame construction. The house was built in 1952 and has 864 square feet of living space. The exterior was wood clap board, the walls and ceilings were constructed of drywall. The roof had asphalt singles and an approximate 4/12 pitch to the roof. The house was positioned on the corner of Woodburn Road and the service road of Veirs Mill.





Tactics and action of crews and units: Chief 702 B lives across the street from the house. After being alerted to the event by another neighbor, he went on the scene quickly and reported a house on fire and established command. He also advised that there was a hydrant across the street on Veirs Mill Rd. Command also spoke with the burn patient who was the lone occupant and advised command that everyone was out of the house. From this point on, no other communications came from command C 702 B. E 703 advised E 721 that they would use a hydrant across the street from the fire building. E 721 acknowledged. E 703 was not in station and was coming from Shady Grove Road and Research Blvd from another call. RS 703 arrived as the first piece of apparatus and positioned on side D of the house. The officer gave an on scene report established command. The officer also did a 360 of the house and provided a report. The burned occupant continued to walk around the scene and was directed back to C 702 B car by HQ staff to wait on EMS. First arriving units had no intervention with the burn patient. M 723 arrived and began patient care and transported the occupant. E 733 provided layout instructions for E 726 for Grandin and Woodburn Road. When E 733 arrived at the hydrant they learned that this was the hydrant that the HQ staff had hand laid too. E 733 then provided additional orders for E 726 to split lay from the intersection to a hydrant. When E 726 arrived they could not pick up E 733 line due to the charged supply line in the street from E 721. E 726 did not pick up the hydrant for E 721. Engine 721 actually arrived as the first engine company and positioned on side D of the house on Woodburn Road. RS 703 officer advised them that a hand line was needed and that they were the first engine on the scene. Attack lines were pulled but no plans were developed to obtain a water supply. E 703 arrived and changed plans and laid a supply line from the dead end of the service road to the front of the building. This change was not communicated to E 721 or command.

E 703 deployed a hand line to the front yard. E 703 had no engine on their hydrant and E 721 had not established a plan for water supply. Fire attack began through the front door. At about this time BC 703 arrived and advised command to transition to the BC 703 car. C 702 B came to BC 703 car and advised BC 703 that he was a provisional chief and had not provided any direction or had any command structure established. BC 703 assumed command and established an operational plan of attack with the DOC. E 703, E 721 and AT 723 were assigned division 1. C 703 F arrived and was assigned the division 1 supervisor. E 733 was ordered to deploy a hand line to side C. T 725 went to the roof and ventilated, and according to division 1 provided immediate relief. E 721 and E 703 did a coordinated attack in the house. One engine went to quad A and B and the other to quadrant C and D. The fire was knocked quickly. E 725 established the RIG group on side A with T 740, RS 742 and M725. Crews then were rotated to rehab and then to overhaul duties. BC 704 was assigned to ISSO.

Fire Investigation: FM 55 and 63 determined that the fire originated in the kitchen on the stove. The occupant had placed a pan on the stove and left it unattended. He discovered the fire and attempted to carry the pan through the house to the outside. His clothing ignited which caused him to drop the pan igniting near-by combustibles. He then escaped. Witnesses advised that the occupant was on fire when he exited the house and the neighbor extinguished the flames with a dry chemical extinguisher.

Improvements that are needed:

- Apparatus that is out of position should communicate this information with ECC and adjustments must be made.

Engine 703 was out of position and did not communicate this to ECC. If this information would have been communicated it would have set the tone for E 721 to assume the first due engine position and establish a water supply.

- Engine 703 and E 721 had no water supply engine on a hydrant. E 703 initially advised they would have their own hydrant but layed from a different hydrant.

It is the responsibility for the second and fifth due engines to enhance and expand the first and fourth in engine companies supply lines. Even though the first due gets its own plug the second and fifth engine companies should seek out the hydrant/engine company and position to reverse lay to an alternative water supply. If a change is made in the original water supply instructions this must be communicated. Engine drivers have to make adjustments if needed. Once the unit officer is engaged in fire ground tactics the driver must step up and make changes that are needed to complete water supplies.

- Either engine company utilized foam solution. FCGO 10-3 states:

On structure fires when the pump is engaged, pump operators shall place the CAFS Compressor in "Standby Mode". CAFS shall not be used during offensive interior attacks. **CAFS is only authorized for use during overhaul, exterior fire fighting and/or exposure protection provided that the CAFS hose line being used does not come from the same engine company that is flowing interior hose lines during an offensive interior attack.**

There is no excuse for not utilizing foam solution.

- No patient care was provided to the burn patient by any first arriving units. ECC advised the ambulance while en-route that there was a burn patient on the scene.

First arriving units must account for all occupants especially when they are provided with information from ECC that there is a patient. In this case the patient had self extricated from the structure, extinguished by a neighbor and was roaming the fire ground when units arrived..

- Hose line management. This house was a typical Veirs Mill Road house. Close to the street and a small yard and apparatus also close. A 2" hose line that was deployed had numerous kinks due to the close proximity of the house. None of the kinks were worked out in timely manner before attack began.

All crews need to make sure that kinks are cleared. Even though you are riding a truck or squad pick and help advance hose a few feet and remove 1 or 2 kinks as you make your way to the house.

- Lack of initial incident management. The first arriving command officer established command but provided no tactical plan. It was learned when BC 703 arrived that the first arriving chief was a "provisional chief". The fact that the chief lived across the street and established command quickly is why units did not have that command established due to the fact that they were probably still turning out on the call and in the station.

Crews need to make an effort to listen up to radios and if there is no direction or a limited radio traffic that something is wrong. This is difficult due to crews being engaged in deploying attack lines and ladders or other chatter on the radio. When we hear that command has been established we cannot let our guard drop. Even though there is a sense of security when command has been established you never know what could change quickly that could impact fire ground tactics. Listen Up.

Conclusion: The success of any incident depends on the first arriving units to set the tone for success by following the SOG's. In this incident if only a few changes were made by communicating with other units this would have changed the course of the incident. This fire was controlled

very quickly with a coordinated attack by E 703 and E 721 with coordinated ventilation by the truck companies and rescue squad. This was a small house and the fire was controlled with apparatus tank water. However this is not the way we do business. We must and it is our first responsibility to take care of and account for the injured first thing. We must use the best extinguishing methods and agents to knock down the fire as quick and as safe as possible. Your first actions always impacts the outcome.